Stuart Hameroff, et.al.; Science of Consciousness II
Book	Page		Topic
Chalmers; Neural Correlate of Consciousness	219		40 Hz oscillations in the cerebral cortex (Crick and Koch 1990)
Chalmers; Neural Correlate of Consciousness	219		Intralamina nucleus in the thalamus (Bogen 1995)		0
Chalmers; Neural Correlate of Consciousness	219		Reentrant loops in the thalamocortical system (Llinas 1994)		0
Chalmers; Neural Correlate of Consciousness	219		Nucleus reticularis (Taylor and Alavi 1995)		0
Chalmers; Neural Correlate of Consciousness	219		Extended reticular-thalamic activation system (Newman and Baars 1993)		0
Chalmers; Neural Correlate of Consciousness	219		Anterior cingulate system (Cotterill 1994)		0
Chalmers; Neural Correlate of Consciousness	219		Neural assemblies bound by NMDA (Flohr 1995)		0
Chalmers; Neural Correlate of Consciousness	219		Temporally extended neural activity (Libert 1994)		0
Chalmers; Neural Correlate of Consciousness	219		Back projections to lower cortical areas (Cauller and Kulics 1991)		0
Chalmers; Neural Correlate of Consciousness	219		Visual processing within the ventral stream (Milner and Goodale 1995)		0
Chalmers; Neural Correlate of Consciousness	220		Neurons in visual cortex projecting to prefrontal areas (Crick and Koch 1995)		1
Chalmers; Neural Correlate of Consciousness	220		Neural activity in V5 (Tootell 1995)		0
Chalmers; Neural Correlate of Consciousness	220		Certain neurons in the superior temporal sulcus and inferior temporal cortex (Logothetis and Schall 1989; Sheinberg and Logothetis 1997)		0
Chalmers; Neural Correlate of Consciousness	220		Neuronal  gesalts in an epicenter (Greenfield 1995)		0
Chalmers; Neural Correlate of Consciousness	220		Outputs of a comparator system in the hippocampus (Gray 1995)		0
Chalmers; Neural Correlate of Consciousness	220		Quantum coherence in microtubules (Hameroff 1994)		0
Chalmers; Neural Correlate of Consciousness	220		Global workspace (Baars 1988)		0
Chalmers; Neural Correlate of Consciousness	220		High-quality representations (Farah 1994)		0
Chalmers; Neural Correlate of Consciousness	220		Selector inputs to action systems (Shallice 1988)		0
Chalmers; Neural Correlate of Consciousness	220		A number of theories of the neural correlate of consciousness give a major role to interactions between the thalamus and the cortex.		0
Chalmers; Neural Correlate of Consciousness	224		Working memory is a major mechanism whereby information is made available for global control.		4
Chalmers; Neural Correlate of Consciousness	226		Crick and Koch have suggested that the visual NCC is not to be found within V1 because V1 does not contain neurons that project to the prefrontal cortex.		2
Chalmers; Neural Correlate of Consciousness	227		If a thalamocortical system turns out to be the neural correlate of consciousness.		1
Greenfield; Rosetta Stone for Mind and Brain	231		When does a baby become conscious?		4
Greenfield; Rosetta Stone for Mind and Brain	231		Consciousness might dawn sometime in infancy.		0
Greenfield; Rosetta Stone for Mind and Brain	232		A plausible explanation is that consciousness has already been long underway in the womb, but if so, when did the baby become conscious?		1
Greenfield; Rosetta Stone for Mind and Brain	232		Human brain has almost the maximal number of neurons by the time the fetus reaches full term.		0
Greenfield; Rosetta Stone for Mind and Brain	232		In the adult brain,    connections between neurons    infiltrate, penetrate, and iterate    thousands and tens of thousands of times    between one cell and the next.		0
Greenfield; Rosetta Stone for Mind and Brain	232		During early life the    growth and density of neurons is conspicuous,    while the environment crafts individual patterns of connectivity.		0
Greenfield; Rosetta Stone for Mind and Brain	232		Brain has no fixed consciousness center;    we have to imagine that consciousness arises    from an assembly of neurons    that are not preordained    but are just transiently large enough.		0
Greenfield; Rosetta Stone for Mind and Brain	232		It is a paradox in terms    to be conscious of nothing;    we must always be conscious of something.		0
Greenfield; Rosetta Stone for Mind and Brain	233		Consciousness entails some sort of focus or epicenter.		1
Greenfield; Rosetta Stone for Mind and Brain	233		In human beings, the sensation of a prick on the skin can be recorded very quickly on the appropriate receiving cortex of the brain. Only after about half a second, however, after the electrical signals have spread over a much larger area, will subjects report that they are conscious of the tingle of the prick.		0
Greenfield; Rosetta Stone for Mind and Brain	233		Transient neuronal assemblies are a reality.		0
Greenfield; Rosetta Stone for Mind and Brain	233		Certain modulator neurotransmitters    will modify the ease    with which neurons are corralled into joining a group    activated by    the pulling power of the epicenter.		0
Greenfield; Rosetta Stone for Mind and Brain	233		Size of a transient neuronal assembly will depend upon the strength of the stimulus epicenter.		0
Greenfield; Rosetta Stone for Mind and Brain	234		Mood-modifying drugs such as Prozac and Ecstasy.		1
Greenfield; Rosetta Stone for Mind and Brain	234		Effect of a chemical depends on its modulating power to determine the size of transient neuronal assemblies.		0
Greenfield; Rosetta Stone for Mind and Brain	234		Degree of consciousness can be seen as related to the number of neurons recruited in a transient assembly.		0
Greenfield; Rosetta Stone for Mind and Brain	234		Several factors, such as arousal levels, extent of epicenter associations, and stimulus strength are each necessary for consciousness, but sufficient only when present together in a specific way.		0
Greenfield; Rosetta Stone for Mind and Brain	234		Where might these fluctuating neuronal assemblies occur in the brain?  [Gestalts]		0
Greenfield; Rosetta Stone for Mind and Brain	234		Any one neuron could participate in many networks simultaneously; each neuron has thousands of connections with other neurons, any of which can be activated under the right conditions.		0
Greenfield; Rosetta Stone for Mind and Brain	234		For most people most of the time, we have only one consciousness at any one time.		0
Greenfield; Rosetta Stone for Mind and Brain	234		Consciousness is spatially multiple but temporally unitary.		0
Greenfield; Rosetta Stone for Mind and Brain	234		Properties of consciousness    could be described as:    (1) spatially multiple yet effectively unitary at any one time,    (2) an emergent property of nonspecialized and divergent groups of neurons that is continuously variable with respect to, and always entailing, a stimulus epicenter,    (3) recruiting power of the epicenter depends on the strength of stimulus signal and extent of associative neuronal conductivity.		0
Greenfield; Rosetta Stone for Mind and Brain	235		One factor governing neural assembly size,   the extent of neuronal connectivity,    is forged in later life    through neural network associations    accumulated in a lifetime of experience.		1
Greenfield; Rosetta Stone for Mind and Brain	235		Fetuses at 26 weeks will exhibit in their brain for the first time consistent electrical activity indicative of a functioning conscious brain.		0
Greenfield; Rosetta Stone for Mind and Brain	235		Adult humans display the REM sleep state a few times each night, whereas a fetus generates it constantly.		0
Greenfield; Rosetta Stone for Mind and Brain	235		Fetuses with their potential for only small neuronal assemblies have a dreamlike consciousness; whereas in adults, small neuronal assemblies will underlie our dreaming consciousness.		0
Greenfield; Rosetta Stone for Mind and Brain	235		When we are asleep we are far less sensitive to the outside world, hence at this time we would expect to have smaller neuronal assemblies due to the lesser strength of potential epicenters not activated in the normal way by our sense organs.		0
Greenfield; Rosetta Stone for Mind and Brain	235		Dreams are a different experience from normal daytime awareness, with their a ruptures in logic and sudden shifts in scene.		0
Greenfield; Rosetta Stone for Mind and Brain	235		Psychiatrist and sleep expert Allan Hobson has found that dreaming has certain parallels to the state of mind of the schizophrenic; the only difference is that the schizophrenic is in a dream, or perhaps a nightmare, much more of the time.		0
Greenfield; Rosetta Stone for Mind and Brain	236		Schizophrenia is alleviated by giving a drug that blocks availability of one modulating chemical that might be in functional excess.		1
Greenfield; Rosetta Stone for Mind and Brain	236		In this way it is possible at the phenomenonological level, to link three very different conditions -- dreaming, schizophrenia, and childhood -- with a common type of consciousness.		0
Greenfield; Rosetta Stone for Mind and Brain	236		Schizophrenic consciousness as a dreamlike state    would be disconnected and highly labile,    as assembly after flimsy neuronal assembly,   formed and reformed    randomly and capriciously.		0
Greenfield; Rosetta Stone for Mind and Brain	236		Throughout the day, and indeed the night,    the depth our consciousness    will be constantly changing.		0
Greenfield; Rosetta Stone for Mind and Brain	236		Noninvasive brain imaging,    though the temporal or spatial resolution    is currently too low to be appropriate,    in a few years will presumably be sensitive enough    that transient populations of neuronal assemblies    can be monitored informatively.		0
Baars; Neuronal Mechanisms of Consciousness	269		Theatrical metaphor -- Consciousness corresponds to the bright spot on the stage, and unconscious systems operate "in the dark" backstage and in the audience.		33
Baars; Neuronal Mechanisms of Consciousness	269		Active bright spot on stage corresponds to working memory.		0
Baars; Neuronal Mechanisms of Consciousness	269		Contextual systems that reside "backstage," shaping the content of consciousness without themselves entering consciousness.		0
Baars; Neuronal Mechanisms of Consciousness	269		Only the global workspace (GW) is conscious at any given moment.  [Edelman's dynamic core]		0
Baars; Neuronal Mechanisms of Consciousness	270		Active bright spot may be closely associated with sensory projection areas that provide the detailed content of sensory consciousness,    closely supported by subcortical systems    in the thalamus, basal ganglia, hippocampus, and brainstem.  [Edelman's dynamic core]		1
Baars; Neuronal Mechanisms of Consciousness	270		Attentional system    selects which of several potential inputs    will become conscious at any one time.  [Edelman's dynamic core]		0
Baars; Neuronal Mechanisms of Consciousness	270		Reticular nucleus in the thalamus (nRt), with its ability to gate traffic from sensory surfaces to cortex, is one natural candidate for a selective attention mechanism.		0
Baars; Neuronal Mechanisms of Consciousness	270		Several other brain loci for visual attention, notably the anterior cingulate, which may be associated with effortal attention.		0
Baars; Neuronal Mechanisms of Consciousness	270		Contextual systems that are subconscious but still shape conscious content may be found in the dorsal visual pathway,    including right parietal cortex,    which provides the object-centered framework    for visual perception.		0
Baars; Neuronal Mechanisms of Consciousness	270		Specialized sources of knowledge that receive conscious input    include frontal cortex,    memory related systems such as the hippocampus,   brain mechanisms for automatic routines such as the basal ganglia,    and mediating emotional processes    such as the limbic system and amygdala.		0
Baars; Neuronal Mechanisms of Consciousness	270		Brain's gross anatomy shows massive fiber tracts leading from posterior to anterior cortex,    from one hemisphere to the other,    and from cortex to thalamus and back again.		0
Baars; Neuronal Mechanisms of Consciousness	270		Each of the massive fiber tracts is known to map significant features of conscious information from one location to another.		0
Baars; Neuronal Mechanisms of Consciousness	270		Broadcasting of cortical sensory information may occur in several directions from sensory cortex:    from back to front,    from side to side,    and from cortex to midbrain    and back again.		0
Baars; Neuronal Mechanisms of Consciousness	270		It has been hypothesized that the neural substrate of the global workspace was an "extended reticular thalamus activating system," (ERTAS).		0
Baars; Neuronal Mechanisms of Consciousness	270		The "extended reticular thalamus activating system," (ERTAS)  acronym emphasizes that it is centered on the thalamus    with its rich, reciprocal projections with the cortex.		0
Baars; Neuronal Mechanisms of Consciousness	270		Layer 1 of the cortex, often viewed as a "feltwork" of neurons that permit not just axonal transmission but horizontal spread of activation.		0
Baars; Neuronal Mechanisms of Consciousness	271		Cortical sensory projection areas seem like a more plausible loci for conscious global workspace, at least for sensory consciousness.		1
Baars; Neuronal Mechanisms of Consciousness	271		Conscious experience involves ceaseless interaction between input (from outside and within the brain) and memory.		0
Baars; Neuronal Mechanisms of Consciousness	271		Conscious experience is relational -- the conscious content of a mental experience is determined by the evocation and intermingling of suitable past memories evoked by the input giving rise to that conscious experience.		0
Baars; Neuronal Mechanisms of Consciousness	271		Relational feature of conscious experience implies a ceaseless dialogue between conscious content and unconscious systems,    notably the hippocampus,    basal ganglia,    and unconscious regions of cortex.		0
Baars; Neuronal Mechanisms of Consciousness	271		Intermingling of past and present requires both long-range intermodal and short range intramodal competition		0
Baars; Neuronal Mechanisms of Consciousness	271		Intermodal (global) inhibition via the nucleus reticularis thalami (nRt).		0
Baars; Neuronal Mechanisms of Consciousness	271		Nucleus reticularis thalami (nRt) seems like an ideal device for achieving global input competition,    being composed solely of inhibitory cells    and also having remarkable lateral connectivity    similar to that of the outer plexiform layer in the retina.		0
Baars; Neuronal Mechanisms of Consciousness	271		Nucleus reticularis thalami (nRt) may bind activities    across modalities.		0
Baars; Neuronal Mechanisms of Consciousness	271		Nucleus reticularis thalami (nRt) supports a far more complex form of spatial competition    than a simple winner-take-all form,    because it produces a wave over the whole thalamocortical system.    There will be many spatial regions over the cortex that have nonzero activity.		0
Baars; Neuronal Mechanisms of Consciousness	271		The centerpiece of the "comparator system" is the hippocampus,    but it's activities are also closely tied to those of the basal ganglia and cortex.		0
Baars; Neuronal Mechanisms of Consciousness	272		Fornix also projects to areas in the basal ganglia, which project to the nucleus reticularis thalami (nRt).		1
Baars; Neuronal Mechanisms of Consciousness	272		Nucleus reticularis thalami (nRt) possible role in selective attention and conscious processing was pointed out by Crick (1984).		0
Baars; Neuronal Mechanisms of Consciousness	272		Because the output of the nucleus reticularis thalami (nRt) neurons is itself inhibitory, it's activation disinhibits the sensory relay pathways;    i.e. increases entry to the cerebral cortex by stimuli that are currently engaging the thalamocortical loops.		0
Baars; Neuronal Mechanisms of Consciousness	272		The crucial aspect for consciousness arising    from unconscious neural activity    is creation of relatively lasting "bubbles" of activity in cortex by local recurrence.    It is proposed that such activity singles out cortical regions with highest density of cells in layers 2 and 3.		0
Baars; Neuronal Mechanisms of Consciousness	272		Neural underpinnings of the global workspace by means of the excellent intercortical connectivity    of such regions as parietal,    inferotemporal    and frontal cortices.		0
Baars; Neuronal Mechanisms of Consciousness	272		Detailed coding of the content of consciousness appears to be cortical,    however, much of the thalamus is involved.		0
Baars; Neuronal Mechanisms of Consciousness	272		At any one time, different sensory inputs,    including such "inner" inputs as visual imagery and inner speech,    compete for access to consciousness.		0
Baars; Neuronal Mechanisms of Consciousness	272		Other possible inputs to consciousness include abstract conscious content such as beliefs and ideas.		0
Baars; Neuronal Mechanisms of Consciousness	272		Materials selected to be conscious    involves both top-down influences and bottom-up inputs.		0
Baars; Neuronal Mechanisms of Consciousness	272		Top-down influences include goal systems associated with frontal cortex,    emotional and motivation systems    combining limbic and right frontal cortex.		0
Baars; Neuronal Mechanisms of Consciousness	272		Conscious content reflects an endless interplay of competition and cooperation between possible inputs and top-down influences.		0
Baars; Neuronal Mechanisms of Consciousness	272		A totally inhibitory system that greatly contributes to global competition is the basal ganglia.		0
Baars; Neuronal Mechanisms of Consciousness	272		Neural model of frontal lobe executive function		0
Baars; Neuronal Mechanisms of Consciousness	273		Brainstem-thalamocortical axis supports the state, but not the detailed content of consciousness, which is produced by cortex.		1
Baars; Neuronal Mechanisms of Consciousness	273		Anatomy and putative functions of the "neural global workspace," extending from the midbrain reticular formation to prefrontal cortex.		0
Baars; Neuronal Mechanisms of Consciousness	273		"Global attentional matrix" centered on the nucleus reticularis thalami (nRt), which both gates information flow to and from the cortex and regulates electrical oscillatory patterns throughout the cortex.		0
Baars; Neuronal Mechanisms of Consciousness	273		Resource allocation as "global attention" -- it's core neural mechanism is an array of gating circuits in the nucleus reticularis thalami (nRt), which covers the lateral surfaces of the thalamus.		0
Baars; Neuronal Mechanisms of Consciousness	273		Through the nucleus reticularis thalami (nRt) pass nearly all of the pathways coursing between the thalamus and the cerebral hemispheres.		0
Baars; Neuronal Mechanisms of Consciousness	273		Via the reciprocal,    nucleus reticularis thalami (nRt) circuits,    the cerebral cortex and brainstem reticular formation    selectively modulate their own information processing activities    in serving conscious perceptions, intentions or plans or both.		0
Baars; Neuronal Mechanisms of Consciousness	273		A selective attention system, including the nucleus reticularis thalami (nRt), selects among multiple possible conscious contents.		0
Baars; Neuronal Mechanisms of Consciousness	273		Attentional selection of conscious content appears to operate by means of the nucleus reticularis thalami (nRt), influenced by several centers from brain stem to the prefrontal cortex.		0
Baars; Neuronal Mechanisms of Consciousness	273		Nucleus reticularis thalami (nRt) is believed to gate the sensory thalamus nuclei, which flow up to the primary projection areas in the cortex, and is the most strategic position for controlling sensory input.		0
Baars; Neuronal Mechanisms of Consciousness	273		Almost 10 times as many visual neurons   go down from the visual cortex to the thalamus    as the other way,    suggesting continuous and intimate looping    between thalamus and cortex,    controlled by nucleus reticularis thalami (nRt).		0
Baars; Neuronal Mechanisms of Consciousness	273		A voluntary component may also act via the anterior cingulate gyrus and the vigilance network of prefrontal cortex.		0
Baars; Neuronal Mechanisms of Consciousness	273		Attentional selection is also influenced by the content of consciousness,    suggesting that reentrant loops from sensory cortex    descend to the major sensory nuclei of the thalamus    to create a self-sustaining feedback loop,    again under nucleus reticularis thalami (nRt) control.		0
Baars; Neuronal Mechanisms of Consciousness	273		Posterior cortex provides sensory conscious content    whereas anterior cortex is involved in active voluntary control.		0
Baars; Neuronal Mechanisms of Consciousness	273		Consciousness containing phenomenal experience.		0
Baars; Neuronal Mechanisms of Consciousness	274		Frontal motor cortical systems such as those involved in thinking and reasoning.		1
Baars; Neuronal Mechanisms of Consciousness	274		Memoral structures needed to give content to consciousness -- primary sensory, postprimary, associative, and heteromodal cortices, all of which are posterior.		0
Baars; Neuronal Mechanisms of Consciousness	274		Active consciousness -- involved in thinking and planning as well as responding in a willful manner.		0
Baars; Neuronal Mechanisms of Consciousness	274		Active consciousness has its major activity involved with anterior cortical, related thalamic, and basal ganglia neural sites, which are known to be crucially involved with actions of either direct motor action or of thought, planning.		0
Baars; Neuronal Mechanisms of Consciousness	275		Remarkable innerconnectivity among all parts of the brain.  Iin the visual system we find top-down feedback from higher visual areas to lower areas, as well as a bottom-up flow going the other way.		1
Baars; Neuronal Mechanisms of Consciousness	275		In thalamocortical loops, the downflowing neurons outnumber the upgoing ones by a ratio of almost ten to one.		0
Baars; Neuronal Mechanisms of Consciousness	275		Blindsight analogues in auditory and somatosensory cortex.		0
Gray; Hard Question of Consciousness	279		Consciousness becomes a problem only at a point at which subjective experience occurs.		4
Gray; Hard Question of Consciousness	279		No problem understanding in principle how brain can carry out the processing of information that is required to link input from the environment through to subsequent behavior.  [Bayesian inference]  [Fuster's  perception-action cycle]		0
Gray; Hard Question of Consciousness	279		Hard problem is that we have no understanding of how the sequence of brain activities give rise to conscious experience.		0
Gray; Hard Question of Consciousness	280		Hard problems of consciousness cover    the perceived world with all of its qualities (visual, auditory, olfactory, etc.),     as well as bodily sensations,    proprioception,    emotional feelings,    dreams,    hallucinations,    mental images,    and internal speech.		1
Gray; Hard Question of Consciousness	280		Integrate into the rest of science the qualitative aspects of our perceptions of the external world    (e.g., the color red,    the smell of a rose,    the feel of cold water on the tongue,    the feel of velvet on the skin),    the more internal aspects of conscious experience    (mental images,    internally spoken or imaged thoughts,    dreams, etc.).		0
Gray; Hard Question of Consciousness	280		Many distinguish scientists and philosophers do not accept a hard problem of consciousness, stated in this or any other way (e.g., Dennet 1991).		0
Gray; Hard Question of Consciousness	281		Four key questions of a successful theory of consciousness.		1
Gray; Hard Question of Consciousness	281		(1) How did conscious experiences evolved?		0
Gray; Hard Question of Consciousness	281		(2) How do conscious experiences confer survival value?		0
Gray; Hard Question of Consciousness	281		(3) How do conscious experiences arise out of brain events?		0
Gray; Hard Question of Consciousness	281		(4) How do conscious experiences alter behavior with which they are associated?		0
Gray; Hard Question of Consciousness	281		Consciousness comes too late to affect the processes to which it is apparently linked.		0
Gray; Hard Question of Consciousness	283		Famous Turing Test, by answering questions indistinguishably from the answers given by human being.		2
Gray; Hard Question of Consciousness	283		It is all in the physics, a view recently advocated by Hameroff and Penrose (1996)		0
Gray; Hard Question of Consciousness	284		Bizarre aberrations of conscious experience that characterize acute schizophrenia.		1
Gray; Hard Question of Consciousness	284		Comparator hypothesis has the general function of predicting, moment by moment, (where a moment is about a 10th of a second long), the next perceived state of the world, comparing this state to the next perceived state, and determining whether the predicted and actual states do in fact match.  [recursion]  [Bayesian inference]  [Fuster's  perception-action cycle]		0
Gray; Hard Question of Consciousness	284		Subicular region of the hippocampal formation is where the key comparisons are postulated to take place.		0
Gray; Hard Question of Consciousness	284		Consciousness consists of activity in the subbicular comparator, together with feedback from the comparator to the sets of neurons and perceptual systems that have provided inputs to the comparator for current comparison.		0
Gray; Hard Question of Consciousness	284		Consciousness comes too late to affect on-line behavior.		0
Gray; Hard Question of Consciousness	285		Features of the contents of consciousness for which the comparator hypothesis offers an account.  (table)		1
Gray; Hard Question of Consciousness	285		Consciousness experience is closely linked to current action plans.  [Fuster's  perception-action cycle]		0
Gray; Hard Question of Consciousness	285		We are conscious of the outputs of motor programs, not of the program itself.		0
Gray; Hard Question of Consciousness	285		Consciousness occurs too late to affect outcomes of the processes to which they are apparently linked.		0
Gray; Hard Question of Consciousness	285		Conscious events occur on a time scale about two orders of magnitude slower than the neural events that underlie them.		0
Gray; Hard Question of Consciousness	285		Conscious experience has a spatiotemporal unity quite unlike the patterns of neuronal events that underlie it.		0
Gray; Hard Question of Consciousness	285		Conscious experience consists of a series of constructions based on a model of the world, not direct reflections of inputs from the world.		0
Gray; Hard Question of Consciousness	285		Consciousness is highly selective.		0
Gray; Hard Question of Consciousness	285		Neuronal events operate in parallel; consciousness operates serially.		0
Gray; Hard Question of Consciousness	285		Conscious experience is closely linked to memory.		0
Gray; Hard Question of Consciousness	288		Sensory systems are modular.		3
Gray; Hard Question of Consciousness	288		Synesthesia is a mixing of the senses.		0
Gray; Hard Question of Consciousness	288		Normal selective neuronal cell death during infancy.		0
Gray; Hard Question of Consciousness	288		In the normally developing brain in many species, many more neuronal connections are made than are finally retained; redundant or maladaptive connections being "pruned" during infancy.		0
Gray; Hard Question of Consciousness	288		In synesthesia, the suggestion has been made that the redundant connections may persist.  Perhaps synesthesia has its origins in infancy.		0